TRACEABILITY, TRADE AND COOL: LESSONS FROM THE EU MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY by Buhr, Brian L.
International Agricultural Trade
Research Consortium
Traceability, Trade and COOL: Lessons  




The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium is an informal association of University and
Government economists interested in agricultural trade.  Its purpose is to foster interaction, improve
research capacity and to focus on relevant trade policy issues.  It is financed by United States
Department of Agriculture (ERS, and FAS), Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the participating
institutions.
The IATRC Working Paper series provides members an opportunity to circulate their work at the
advanced draft stage through limited distribution within the research and analysis community.  The
IATRC takes no political positions or responsibility for the accuracy of the data or validity of the
conclusions presented by working paper authors.  Further, policy recommendations and opinions
expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the IATRC or its funding agencies.  For a
copy of this paper and a complete list of IATRC Working Papers, books, and other publications, see
the IATRC Web Site  http://www.iatrcweb.org
This paper was presented at the IATRC Annual Meeting, December 15-17, 2002, Monterey,
California.  The Theme Day focused on “Consumer-Driven Agriculture and Trade.”
*Brian Buhr is Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota. 
Correspondence regarding this paper should be addressed to:
Professor Brian Buhr
Department of Applied Economics
University of Minnesota
231 Classroom Office Building
1994 Buford Ave.
St. Paul, MN 55108
Phone: 612-625-2744  E-mail: bbuhr@apec.umn.edu
                                           April 2003
ISSN 1098-9218






























Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Economics, University of 
Minnesota, 218C Classroom Office Building 1994 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, 
MN 55108-6040. bbuhr@apec.umn.edu 
 
The Midwest Agricultural Trade and Industry Consortium (MATRIC) is 
gratefully acknowledged for providing funding for this project. 





The traditional food supply chain is arranged as a complex array of producers, handlers, 
processors, manufacturers, distributors and retailers.  As the food supply chain grew in 
complexity over time, little emphasis was placed on preserving information regarding the 
origin of raw materials and their transformation, often by multiple handlers, into 
consumer ready products.   This paper provides case illustrations of the implementation 
of information systems for support of traceability in Europe.  Emphasis is on the firm 
level costs and benefits as well as the broader market structure and governance issues 
inherent in information economics of the firm. 
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  2 Introduction 
Food safety issues in meat and livestock have come to the forefront in recent 
years with high profile incidences of contamination by e. coli, BSE, dioxin, hormones 
and antibiotics all contributing to a desire to find ways to improve quality control systems 
in the meat supply chain.  In the U.S., the primary large-scale response has been to 
implement HACCP programs from slaughter to retail.  However, in the case of BSE or 
hormone and antibiotic residues the need for quality control programs extends farther 
back to feeding and management practices on the farm or even feed manufacturing.  
Extending this to include the use of genetically modified feed ingredients; product 
integrity must be controlled at the crop production stage of the supply chain.  As a result, 
there are increasing calls for meat supply chain traceability initiatives along with identity 
preservation of genetically modified crop products.   
A few recent economic studies have addressed the traceability issue.  Liddell and 
Bailey examine the broader market implications of traceability by ranking the relative 
development of traceability systems in the U.S. to other competing countries in world 
markets.  They suggest the U.S. lags behind in areas of both food safety and quality 
control, particularly when compared to European suppliers such as Denmark and the 
U.K.  A recent study by Dickinson and Bailey show that consumers in the U.S. may be 
willing to pay for traceability and transparency in meat products.  Hooker, Nayga and 
Siebert examine the food safety activities in the beef industry and primarily focus on the 
results of surveys regarding the ability to implement food safety practices, including 
traceable supply chains.  Most processors in the U.S. and Australia viewed it as feasible, 
but the particulars of how it might be implemented or the economic costs of 
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costs of identity preservation and segmentation of grains, but construct their economic 
results from an economic engineering perspective.  Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes 
take a similar approach with regard to grains and Hobbs develops an economic 
engineering approach to implementation of traceability in beef processing.  In sum all 
papers focus on either the consumer demand for the attribute of traceability or the 
physical costs of traceability.  However, this paper focuses on the economics of 
information and information systems as it relates to traceability in the meat supply chain.  
Case Study Participants and Methods 
Six European organizations employing traceability programs in meat or poultry 
were chosen for this investigation.  The criteria for choosing participants was that they 
must have an electronic based traceability system which encompassed live animal 
production through retail sale of meat or poultry products.  Primary contacts were made 
through USDA, FAS offices in the country of the firms and then leads were followed to 
identify key personnel in the production system.  The six participating entities include a 
poultry production system (Label Rouge/Challans, France); an egg production system 
(KAT/Wiesengold, Germany), a salmon production system (Intentia/Nutreco, Norway), a 
veal production system (The VanDrie Group, The Netherlands) a lamb, pork and beef 
supply chain (Scase-Intentia/Gilde, Norway) and a beef production system in the 
Scotland (Scotbeef).   In examining these systems several supporting organizations were 
also visited, including the Poultry, Livestock and Meat Board in The Netherlands, several 
governmental agencies in France, Carrefour supermarkets in France and ASDA 
supermarkets in the UK.  There are several other firms implementing traceability 
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Beltrace (Belgium) but which we were unable to gain entry; in some cases due to simple 
scheduling conflicts.  Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the firms 
included in the case studies.  The objectives of the site visits were to document the supply 
chain production protocols, examine alternative forms of governance structures for 
supply chain traceability and document methods of electronic traceability.  A team of two 
researchers conducted site visits and typically site visits included one or two day visits to 
key production facilities (farm, processing and retail).  It was also a requirement that the 
teams were able to meet with key personnel at each stage of the process to interview them 
regarding their experience.  Prior to the site visits participants were asked to compile 
documentation regarding the operation that might support understanding of their systems.  
Most were quite willing to do this given that it was consistent with their objective of 
transparency in their production chain.   
Traceability: Production and Information Systems Architecture 
The general concept of traceability as implemented by the case study participants 
included three components – (1) management of the physical supply chain, (2) 
management of the parallel information system to maintain traceability and (3) 
organizational structures to manage and implement the production and information 
systems.  This section provides a description of these aspects.  For the most part this 
section is ‘fact’ base with little discussion of the implications, but sets the stage for the 
economic issues to be considered. 
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In all cases, the traceability systems extend from the feed manufacturing process 
through retail.  Also, each case has unique production protocols that support the 
development of particular consumer product attributes such as organic, group housing, 
free range or antibiotic free production.  All are also clearly focused on the issue of food 
safety.  The production protocols typically stipulate production inputs such as feeds, 
health treatments, and animal rearing methods (e.g., non-cage, group housing, free-range) 
and genetics.  Production protocols are enforced at all stages of the production process by 
auditing and production records.  Methods for monitoring production included sampling 
of feces, feed or meat; cross-referencing feed delivery timing and use to correlated 
production variables such as daily gain; and site visits by auditing firms or certified 
veterinary or farm management services.   
Maintaining traceability through vertical stages requires that firms be organized in 
a structure conducive to passing products while maintaining their identity.  We observed 
three basic organizational structures.   Label Rouge (the most complex) is organized as a 
cooperative with strong government oversight.  At the other end of the spectrum is the 
VanDrie Group and Nutreco who are completely vertically integrated systems. And in-
between, the KAT egg system in Germany represented an independent standards setting 
group which worked with cooperatives to facilitate production.  Gilde Norge is a 
cooperative structure as well.  A later section on governance issues will address the 
organizational structures more extensively. 
In the case of Label Rouge (Figure 1), the French government owns the overall 
rights to Label Rouge labeling and certification.  The Ministry of Agriculture establishes 
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as a mediator between the government and the quality groupes which work directly with 
the farmers as a management advisor.  Any group of producers may submit alternative 
production protocols for approval by the government. This includes a description of the 
standards and how they will be implemented and enforced through auditing agencies.  
Auditing agencies are also certified by the government, but are autonomous from either 
the government or quality groups to avoid conflict of interest.  One of the key criteria for 
approval of standards is that the product must be quantitatively differentiable from other 
products in the market.  Other systems have similar structures of independent auditing 
agencies, and submission of production protocols by members of the group.   However, 
Label Rouge is the only one that relies heavily on government regulation and control.   
The others implemented government guidelines in their protocols (e.g., not feeding 
animal by-products, or animal rearing conditions), but are private enterprises managing 
their own certification and production protocols.  KAT in Germany offers an excellent 
example of producer cooperative organization that developed cooperative standards, 
monitoring and enforcement.  They purposely avoid government intervention because 
they are seeking to set EU wide standards which can be implemented in multiple 
countries and avoid potentially conflicting country specific regulations.   
Logistics management in production becomes a key enabler of traceability.  
Animal supplies, slaughter times and locations, feed deliveries and other aspects are all 
tightly coordinated because the supply chains are closed.  Animals must be identified 
when they are born, carefully tracked as they are moved between farms and then tracked 
at slaughter if they are to be identified by the final product.  The most intensive points of 
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inputs and packing plants where carcasses are disassembled).   Batch integrity quickly 
becomes an important production management tool by reducing the shear number of 
observations (e.g., animals, vs. pens, vs. barns vs. farms).  The more individual elements 
(e.g., animals) that are treated identically the greater ease in managing production 
protocols.  Hence, production methods often fit the scale of barns.  It’s very much 
analogous to all-in-all-out production management already common in the swine 
industry.  Batch production also reduces the cost of logistics. For example, the VanDrie 
group veal processing system tracks individual animals through the processing chain to 
the point where a final retail portion cut at retail could be tracked to an individual animal.  
This incremental product tracking system required them to reconfigure their entire cut 
floor and handling system in manufacturing fresh veal cuts. They estimated costs for 
complete implementation of the information system (scanners, production chain changes, 
additional employees) in a single veal processing plant at $6.5 million and approximately 
$24 million dollars to implement it across their feed manufacturing, farms and processing 
plants.  To put this in perspective the VanDrie group consists of two slaughter plants 
which each slaughter approximately 350,000 head of calves per year, 100 farm 
operations, three veal fabrication and processing plants (primals are shipped in and 
converted to case ready) and two milk powder manufacturing plants for feed (~100,000 
tons per plant per year).  To contrast, Gilde which had recently built a slaughter plant 
capable of individual cut tracking, estimated the cost of the information system 
components (i.e., industrial personal computer stations, servers, and software) to be only 
approximately $150,000 for a single slaughter plant similar in capacity to VanDries’ Ekro 
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system requirements are relatively inexpensive, but configuring the production process to 
maintain traceability to the cut level is quite expensive.  Thus, a very important 
consideration is the economic trade-off inherent in the level of traceability desired (e.g., 
individual retail ready cuts vs. individual animals, vs. farm, etc.). 
Pricing methods are also impacted by the tightly coordinated production systems 
necessary to support traceability.  In all cases prices originated at retail.  Retail prices for 
case ready meat and egg products are transmitted directly from the particular retailer to 
the processing plants and then printed as part of the labeling information.  However, 
prices to the farm and feed processing are negotiated.  In the case of Label Rouge, prices 
for each participant in the production chain are derived from the retail price and 
dependent upon current overall commodity conditions.  For example, if the cost of feed 
ingredients increased, farmers were paid a higher payment for the broilers to compensate 
for a portion of the feed costs.  All members of the syndicate, including processors, 
farmers, feed suppliers and hatcheries, negotiate prices quarterly.  Similar arrangements 
existed for all cooperative forms of organization.  However, in the case of integrated 
firms such as VanDrie, prices received for the final product were allocated through the 
firm on a cost of production basis.  Farmers in this case are contract growers paid a fixed 
fee for management. 
Information Systems 
Information systems observed range from relying heavily on paper and personal 
computers to fully web-integrated traceability systems.  However, it is clear that all will 
evolve to incorporate the Internet because of its inherent merits for creating large and 
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the computer database applications and the hardware necessary to collect and record data.      
One of the first insights gained is that traceability is a subset of total supply chain 
management and therefore, can be considerably less expensive to implement than a full-
scale supply chain management system. This is because only the data on the product 
attributes itself must be maintained in this information chain.   Secondary information 
such as personnel issues, billing and invoicing, financial planning, ordering, replenishing 
and forecasting are not central to maintaining traceability, are likely proprietary to the 
firm, and kept outside the traceability information flow.   
Figure 2 shows a schematic of Gilde Norge’s information system implemented 
with assistance from SCASE (hardware development) and Intentia (software 
development).  It is representative of other state of the art systems observed.  Figure 2 
shows an overall product supply chain, including farms, ingredient suppliers (for 
simplicity simply feed, but can include seasonings at processing), the retail/distribution 
stage, consumers and the slaughter and processing plant itself.  The vertical members of 
the supply chain all connect into the traceable information flow via the Internet.  
Therefore, there is typically a dedicated server which provides the interface and database 
for the traceability data.  Each entity may maintain their own servers for their specific 
databases and simply allow queries through their firewall or there may be a central 
system managed by one of the entities on behalf of the participants.  The latter is often 
the case between farms and processors or feed suppliers since few farmers have the 
information technology access (knowledge or capital) to create an internal information 
system with Internet capabilities.  Underneath the Internet, which allows connectivity 
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planning systems (ERP’s).  ERP’s are simply the platform on which company specific 
information resides (a prototypical structure is shown in Figure 2).  The ERP will  locally 
store all information regarding all activities electronically collected by the firm.  The left 
hand side of the diagram illustrates the structure for Gilde to actually interface the 
physical data of the product with the digital traceability record.  To the extent possible, 
information is gathered through electronic industrial data terminals.  For example, each 
animal enters the plant with an ear tag printed with a conventional 12-digit barcode.  This 
barcode is the animal’s identification number and is cross-tabulated with the truck license 
plate and farm information which has been manually keyed into a personal computer with 
a local area network connection.  The animal identification number remains with the 
carcass at all times, through sequential bar-coding.  At the processing stages that primals 
and subsequent cuts are removed, barcode tags are created by printers and attached to 
each part of the animal as it is removed from the aggregate carcass.  The unique barcodes 
of each cut are also entered into the ERP system.  This process continues until the final 
case ready product is labeled with a barcode (this is in addition to the sale barcode which 
contains pricing information as well) and can be identified through retail scanning.  Only 
that data which is necessary to assure traceability is accessible by other participants in the 
chain. This information usually includes the animal identification., the farm on which it 
was raised, the method of rearing, the feed supplier name and types of treatments (e.g., 
antibiotic, vaccinations, etc.).  This information typically resides on the processors’ 
information system because it serves as the natural aggregation point of data between 
diverse farms, feed suppliers and stores which are in the product supply chain.  This leads 
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implementing traceability, it is the processors that played the pivotal role in managing the 
traceability systems since they are the primary interface between the farm product and the 
consumer ready product.   
A good example of the efficiency of these systems for managing products occurs 
in the case of feed milling.  Navobi, one of the feed suppliers for the VanDrie Group, 
uses electronic ration balancing for their milk replacer mixing.  As a result they are able 
to uniquely identify all sources and quantities of ingredients in each batch of milk 
replacer.  A subset of this information (ingredient list (not quantities), batch identification 
number, and microbiological assays) is uploaded to their web server that can be accessed 
via a password. Subsequent stages in the chain (veal farmers and packers) can examine 
this information, but cannot access other information which may be proprietary such as 
the proportion of ingredients used in the formulation, or price of ingredients.   The merits 
of this information system are considerable in that it captures the efficiency of production 
management systems (ERP's), while enabling efficient transmission of information to 
upstream and downstream participants in the chain while maintaining security for the 
entity.  
A component equally important for gathering data is hardware necessary to 
measure and collect the data on products.  Weigh scales with data ports, visual carcass 
grading technologies which enabled capture of key carcass parameters, water monitoring 
devices for measuring mixing ratios of calf-milk replacer are all examples of data 
collection devices which greatly enhance the ability to capture production information.  
These lower the costs of collection by reducing labor requirements and improving 
  12accuracy and avoiding the error of human input.  At this point, processing plants (feed 
and meat/egg) have a much higher level of automated data collection hardware than 
farms.  This was particularly true in cases where the farms are mostly independent from 
the rest of the chain.  
In addition to measurement devices, there must be methods to physically identify 
products.  Interestingly, the everyday barcode was still the primary vehicle for labeling 
products.  Two firms (Gilde and VanDrie) had experimented with implantable microchips 
and radio frequency transmitters (RFID’s), but found they are unreliable compared to 
inexpensive barcodes.  The primary problem with implantable chips is that they migrated 
in the animal so they were difficult to find, and more importantly may have carried a food 
safety risk in themselves, and RFID’s had production line difficulties in getting them to 
read properly.  At farms, much of the information was still captured via human data entry 
from paper reports, and multiple copies of paper reports are kept on file at other 
participants’ locations or at enabling agencies. 
The state of the art systems are real-time and transparent to anyone.  In the cases 
of KAT and VanDrie they have consumer focused websites where the consumer may 
take the code number from their egg or package of veal, enter it into a website and 
actually see the farms and production plants where the product originated and a limited 
set of information on the production protocols, any quality assurance tests which had 
been done and their results.  For an illustration, visit VanDrie's customer website at 
http://www.vealvision.com. 
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  To this point the primary emphasis of the paper has been a description of the 
traceability systems in place.  This is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
defining the economic issues arising from traceability as experienced by our case study 
participants.  Following is a description of the economic implications of these systems as 
identified by the participants. 
Branding, Consumer Demand and Value Added 
When case participants were asked why they adopted traceability, the first 
response in every case was: “consumers demanded to know where their food came from 
and how it was produced.”  Historical food safety issues such as dioxin contamination, 
BSE in cattle, radiation contamination as well as increased demand for organic and non-
GMO products or free-range products were all cited as contributing to the consumers’ 
preferences.  Mostly these are credence attributes that are only verifiable by assurances of 
the seller.  This is in contrast to physical attributes (e.g., the color of the meat) that are 
easily observable and verified by the consumer.  Table 2 provides examples of prices 
received for products sold by participants compared to conventional products.  Clearly 
participant products are priced higher than conventional products.  However, the value of 
the credence attributes themselves is typically commingled with the value of the product 
attribute of traceability per se.   So, it is impossible to say how much value consumers 
actually placed on traceability.  However, participants believed that it enabled them to 
differentiate their products from others making similar product attribute claims, but not 
including traceability protocols.  One participant illustrated this point by quoting Ronald 
Reagan in regard to nuclear arms reduction as “trust but verify”.  
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traditional branding.   Traditional branding has two primary benefits: it allows the buyer 
to capture the value of their particular product by differentiating it to the consumer and it 
enforces truth telling through a form of  “reputational traceability” in the sense the 
company and it’s brand are held accountable for delivering what they say they will 
deliver – in the present case a safe and wholesome food product containing the credence 
attributes promised.   Electronic traceability also allowed the firms to extend the brand 
and reputational aspects back through the supply chain to all suppliers who otherwise 
would be anonymous to the final consumer. 
Finally, the limited use of product liability litigation as a form of consumer 
protection and redress may also explain why traceability has become much more popular 
in the European countries.  This is important for two reasons.  One is it certainly adds 
additional incentive for the brander in the U.S. to maintain product safety and quality 
even without traceability or face legal and financial penalties.  Conversely, the lack of 
product liability suits makes upstream suppliers less reticent about being identified and 
more willing to participate in traceability – the concern in the U.S. being that anonymity 
is good if you’re potentially going to be named in a lawsuit. 
Food Safety Economics  
Traceability has two components in its production economic effects on food 
safety: (1) it assists in identifying the origin of the food safety problem and (2) it likely 
reduces the costs of containing a food safety problem if it occurs.  Navobi, the calf-milk 
replacer manufacturer, provided an excellent example of this point.  Their veterinary 
services identified a salmonella problem in routine on-farm testing.  They immediately 
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identify all other farms using feed from the same batches and which ingredients and their 
sources had gone into the suspected feed batches.  Therefore, they were also immediately 
able to go back to plant records to crosscheck feed testing which had occurred prior to its 
sale.  They found that no feed was contaminated and that the salmonella had been 
introduced by other means on the farm.  Without traceability they would have recalled all 
suspected feed immediately to reduce the risk of cross contamination to other farms, and 
likely wouldn’t have been able to identify as quickly that the contamination had occurred 
on the farm versus at the manufacturing plant.  Had it occurred at the manufacturing 
plant, they also would have been able to trace the product forward and been able to target 
farmers that received the feed rather than issue a broader recall.  Navobi conducted an ex 
post assessment of the cost savings from traceability in this circumstance, and estimated 
in this single instance it saved them over $100,000 in recalls and recovery costs.   
Participants suggested that valuation of traceability in a food safety context 
depends on the following issues: (1) the accuracy of testing and sampling procedures for 
detecting contamination, (2) the costs of sampling and testing or control (HACCP) 
procedures, (3) the dispersion of the product once it leaves the control of the firm, (4) the 
probability of contamination itself, (5) the costs of recall and (6) any potential costs in 
terms of liability and reputational damage.  What traceability likely contributes to these 
issues is that it reduces the costs of recovering from a food safety outbreak and to some 
extent may reduce the probability of outbreak by improving information within the 
process and enabling communication and identification of potential issues more quickly 
and efficiently among participants.  To simplify this logic, think of it as the proverbial 
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issues through preventative measures such as improved sampling, testing procedures and 
technologies, or you can reduce the “pounds” or costs of compensating should an incident 
occur.   
Traceability also affected the ability to allocate costs and benefits of value 
through the supply chain.  The current issue with many food safety issues is that the 
restaurant, grocer or institution which last handles the product before consumption is the 
initial focal point for identifying the problem and also for resolving it and potentially 
bearing the liability costs.  Similar allocation problems may exist at all stages of the 
chain.  In this case, traceability plays an important role in both allocating costs once an 
outbreak has occurred, but probably also inherently improves it because firms are more 
likely to implement control procedures knowing that their probability of being identified 
and held responsible is much greater.  
Management Value of Traceability 
Participants also report that traceability often has internal production benefits 
from improved information and control of production even though traceability has 
generally been couched as a supply chain management issue driven by consumer 
demand.  In large part this stems from the incorporation of ERP systems at the firm level 
that inherently improve data collection, as well as analysis, diagnosis and response to 
potential production problems.  
Perhaps Gilde Norge, the Norwegian slaughtering plant, provided the best 
illustration.  In implementing traceability, they incorporated a visual grading system.  In 
this system, the carcass is photographed on the line and a computer program immediately 
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instantaneously compared to previous carcass yields from similar carcasses already in the 
database.  This information is passed to terminals along the line, which show appropriate 
cuts to be made in subsequent fabrication to maximize the yields of the carcass.  As the 
carcass is fabricated, data is captured on the actual yields of the fabricated cuts and 
compared to the predicted values prior to fabrication.  This ongoing real-time analysis of 
carcass cutouts aids in quality control and improves yields. In fact, at the end of each 
week the workers on the line are evaluated based on the data collected on their cutting 
efficiency and abilities to meet expected cutout yields with actual yields.  They attributed 
this continuous improvement as adding five to seven percent to their final meat yields.   
Similarly, in all cases strict controls on feed use and scheduling of delivery of 
animals naturally led to improved production management for growth efficiency and 
certainly enabled benchmarking of farms within the production system as was the case 
with Label Rouge in Challans.  Each grower received a quarterly report of their relative 
efficiency compared to other growers within the syndicate. 
Traceability has a multifaceted economic impact on firms and the supply chain.  
The key point is that there are potentially real economic cost and management benefits at 
the firm level at the same time that it improves coordination and allocation of values and 
costs in the supply chain.  Many participants had concluded that the production and 
management benefits are great enough to warrant traceability adoption even without 
considering any potential added willingness to pay by consumers – even though as 
pointed out at the beginning of this discussion they viewed consumer preferences as the 
primary driver of their original adoption. 
  18Governance and Structural Change Issues 
Our case visits also revealed that traceability has implications for the structure of 
the supply chain and how firms organize.  There are two aspects of impacts on 
governance and structure: (1) the organization and structure of the firms themselves and 
(2) the organization of the controlling agencies and auditing firms.  All participant 
systems incorporating traceability are very tightly coordinated.  The VanDrie group and 
Nutreco are completely vertically integrated, except for growers which are sometimes 
contract growers and sometimes owned production units.   Gilde and Wiesengold are 
cooperatives, but growers are tightly organized through contractual membership into the 
supply chain.  Lable Rouge is organized as “syndicates” with feed companies, growers 
and plants pre-approved for membership, but products within the syndicate can be 
transferred among alternative members.  In all cases the production chains are relatively 
small scale compared to North American commercial production standards.  The key 
issue with size and structure is the scale compatibility between stages of production 
which enables traceability.  In other words, it generally took a relatively small number of 
growers to satisfy the demands of processing plants or to absorb the supply of feed plants.  
The primary scale incompatibilities in the North American supply chain may very well be 
that processing plants and feed manufacturing plants are of such a scale that it presents 
coordination problems with the large number of growers needed to manage traceability in 
the supply chain.  The fewer operations which need to be traced the more easily 
traceability can be implemented.  In fact, VanDrie had difficulty coordinating their 
conventional beef operations for traceability because it required over 500 growers versus 
the 100 growers who supply their veal operations.  One hypothesis is that traceability 
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on a smaller scale than non-traceable commodity production.  This observation is clearly 
dependent on future advances in tracking hardware technologies for measuring traceable 
attributes. 
In the case of Label Rouge and Wiesengold, there are “control agencies”.  The 
control agencies (KAT in the case of Wiesengold and Sylac in the case of Challans/Label 
Rouge) are responsible for managing records, establishing production protocols and 
standards, arranging for auditing and maintaining the databases supporting traceability.  
In other cases, the controls are internal.  Auditing agencies are always external to avoid 
conflict of interest in application of production standards and traceability.  Label Rouge 
also has extensive government involvement in managing the system.  The Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance have roles in developing and approving 
standards, establishing labeling requirements, and in preventing fraud.  No other system 
has direct government involvement although government policies on traceability and 
food safety often influenced their decision to implement traceability or how it was 
implemented.  As an independent controlling agency, KAT offers a good example of how 
production protocols and participation is managed.  The European Poultry, Egg and 
Game Association developed KAT.  It developed the traceability information system and 
also manages the control processes and data collection.  However, outside auditing 
agencies perform system checks to assure compliance with their protocols.  Members 
such as Wiesengold propose standards (such as feeding, medication, and other production 
protocols) which distinguish their supply chain.  Producer members can then approve or 
reject these standards.   Once approved, all members are audited, including processors, 
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annual basis or around production flows of the system such as when animals are ready for 
slaughter or when new animals are brought into the system.  Members pay a fee for the 
audits and for being members of the control group.  Table 3 provides examples of the 
costs of the auditing and quality control programs for Label Rouge and 
KAT/Wiesengold.  Members who do not comply are removed from the system. This is 
very important as they recognize their vulnerability to lapses in quality control given their 
added implication of safety. 
It will generally be true that intensive traceability as we observed would require 
very tightly coordinated supply chains.  How this coordination is achieved will also be 
important.  The cooperative forms all recognized two potential problems 1) it is difficult 
to get membership buy-in to new protocols which may require increased investment since 
the members were otherwise autonomous 2) the reticence to change may affect their 
ability to be responsive to changing demands or new innovations.   It appears that full 
integration has merits in both of these instances, where protocols can be updated and 
enforced at will.  Secondly, it is clear that traceability has implications for size 
compatibility among participants in the supply chain.  It appears that very large plants 
with a large number of suppliers or buyers will have difficulty managing traceability – 
it’s simply a numbers game and as numbers increase logistics and control become more 
expensive.  Information technologies are successful at reducing the costs of managing 
large numbers of records, but the requirement of control, auditing and verification is still 
largely a hands-on process which gets more costly as scale increases.   
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When this research was originally proposed, we were focused on issues of supply 
chain efficiency and the role of information systems.  As we began scheduling site visits, 
the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK, the events of September 11, and 
subsequent anthrax terrorism in the U.S. had a direct bearing on the implications of our 
research.   Traceability affects the ability to contain both natural outbreaks of devastating 
diseases such as foot and mouth disease, but also on the ability to respond to and contain 
potential food borne bio-terrorism events. While much of this paper considers the 
implications on firms, traceability is a public health and policy issue.  Since we did not 
specifically consider the issues of the public costs of disease outbreaks it’s difficult to 
estimate the potential benefits of animal identification and tracking systems but in the 
case of the UK outbreak of FMD costs to the agriculture and food chain were estimated 
as $4.8 billion (Countryside Agency).  Animal identification and tracking seems to be a 
minimal set of traceability which would enable quick identification and tracking of all 
affected animals and minimize the scope of such an outbreak.  This is clearly already the 
objective of the EU animal passport system.  Developing national systems on the order of 
the VanDrie Group’s intensity would likely be extremely burdensome from a cost 
perspective.  Similarly, doing nothing likely exposes extreme public health and economic 
risks.   
So far, much of the discussion of trade implications has focused on market (or 
consumer) aspects e.g., Liddell and Bailey.  The argument tends to be that some countries 
(consumers) have a preference for traceability and the lack of traceability by the U.S. 
harms its ability to capture those export sales and also reduces the United States’ ability 
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argument is that consumers may have a preference for products from one or another 
country and should have the right to know which country products came from.  This 
“right to know” could arguably be left to voluntary traceability requirements.   In essence 
the marketing arguments are completely analogous to those described earlier in this paper 
for firm level implications relating to branding, consumer preferences, product recall, 
liability and cost competitiveness. 
However, if traceability becomes mandatory, it may have implications for trade 
agreements.  The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) agreement and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement provide complementary guidelines to 
establish technical requirements for meeting other countries’ sanitary and quality 
standards.  Traceability may or may not be classified as a technical barrier if it is not also 
required of domestic products and if it does not provide a justifiable need for product 
quality and safety.   This is why it is important to understand whether traceability itself 
improves safety or whether quality assurance standards themselves provide this 
assurance.  A good example of this issue is the EU Commission’s proposal for labeling 
and tracing genetically modified organisms.  Clearly the issue is entangled with the 
validity of the EU’s ban on GMO’s per se.  If GMO’s are ruled as being scientifically 
safe, their ban is unjustified and therefore, traceability required of exporters where 
GMO’s are raised (vs. the EU which is purportedly GMO free) represents a trade barrier 
by raising the costs of the products which must be segmented, tested and labeled as to 
their contents.  Another example of traceability’s potential impact on existing trade 
restrictions is the EU’s ban on U.S. beef due to hormone usage.  In this case, the credence 
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allowing it’s acceptance into EU countries versus the ban on all beef products now due to 
the inability to verify hormone-free products.   
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has raised several issues which require further empirical investigation. 
However, the data from our visits also provides some guidance for some relatively 
confident conclusions.  First, it is clear that electronic information systems greatly 
improve the potential for identify preservation, management of the supply chain and firm 
level management.  Second, it is very likely that traceability will lead to more closely 
coordinated supply chains.  Whether these can be cooperatively managed or if vertical 
ownership is more efficient is an empirical question.  Third, traceability can improve the 
allocation of economic values, but the empirical question is does integration do the same 
thing and to what extent does integration become more valuable because of traceability 
and the ability to increase the control of a broader asset base.  Fourth, while traceability is 
commonly considered a consumer demand issue, the greatest direct benefits appear to be 
from improvements in management and production efficiency.  Finally, producers must 
begin to consider how they can capture and control their own information to improve the 
value of traceability for their own situation. 
Given recent events, a relevant question in the U.S. is one of “how much 
traceability is enough traceability?”   For example, without any additional investment in 
the U.S. meat supply chains, animals likely can be traced from packing plants back to 
individual finishing farms by using existing business documents such as invoices, 
shipping or weight tickets and other similar documentation.  Lot or batch numbers can 
  24also be used to trace most meat products back to plant of origin and even with a 
reasonable level of confidence to the date they were manufactured and therefore narrow 
the window of possible sources of contamination.  Is that enough?  Would we also like to 
be able to trace the feed batches?  Would we also like to know before actual entrance into 
the meat chain what other farms may have been supplied this feed?  This is the central 
policy and business issue in traceability, particularly when considering food safety issues.  
How much is enough depends on the costs of tracing products, the potential costs if a 
contaminating event occurs and the potential costs of recall or discovery if a 
contaminating event occurs.  These costs in turn are affected by the likelihood of a food 
safety event occurring and also the ability to control this likelihood given quality control 
strategies (e.g., feed testing at the farm) and the ability to intervene (e.g., irradiating for 
biological pathogens).  This complex set of trade-offs is basically what defines how much 
is enough.  As the U.S. meat industry considers traceability, the European experiences 
provide excellent insight into alternative information, production and management 
systems that can be used to achieve a range of desired levels of traceability. 
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Table 1.  Overview of Firms in Case Study 



































































































































































































































  26 
  27
Ministry of Agriculture: 
- Labeling 
- Standards  Approval 
- Veterinary 
Services/Testing 









-  Synalaf in Poultry 
-  38 organizations (e.g., Sylac) 
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-  Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance both approve Certifying Organizations. 
-  Certifying Organizations report to both Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance. 
-  Synalaf is a Quality Groupe that oversees all Label Rouge Poultry 
-  Sylac falls under Synalaf as one particular set of standards for Label Rouge Poultry. There are 
many other Groupes. 
-  Synalaf acts as liaison for standards approval and control for producers 
-  Sylac manages operations of groupe – maintains records, reports to Synalaf on controls, 
coordinates quality certification (e.g., site visits), and reconciles traceability checkpoints (e.g., 
feed quantity w/ number of birds fed or chicks delivered and chicks slaughtered. 
-  Ministry of Agriculture, Certifying Organizations and Sylac/Synalaf all maintain databases of 
relevant information, but these don’t necessarily communicate. 
 
Ministry of Finance 
- Fraud  Division 
- Approve  Certifying 
Organizations 
































Note:  Similar information system architectures as
Gilde (at left) often exist for other suppliers
as well, or they may cooperate to manage
information systems. 
Table 2.  Comparative Prices of Quality Assured Products and Conventional Products 
Item 
 
Quality Assured Product 
(organic) Conventional  Product 
Weisengold Eggs
a  $0.30/egg $0.10/egg 
Challan Whole Chickens
b  $4.50/kg $2.60/kg 
Pork Loins
c  $12.90/kg $11.57/kg 
Beef Tenderloin
c  $19.53/kg $12.45/kg 
Carrefour Poultry
c  $5.51/kg $4.15/kg 
aPrices in Koln, Germany.  KAT Certified Organic and Free Range Eggs. Conventional 
eggs had no traceability or quality traits 
bPrices in Challan, France.  Label Rouge organic and free range whole chickens versus 
conventional whole chickens at retail. 
cPrices in Carrefour Store, Paris, France.  Quality assured products are all organic but not 
Label Rouge.  Conventional products have no quality assured traits. 
All prices converted to U.S. dollars using exchange rates corresponding to date of visits.
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